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1. Introduction
If one accepts the vtew that prices are ~iot fully flexíhle
macroeconomic analysis has a long way to go. First, with prices fixed in
the short run rationing in markets becomes a central issue. Second, if
price adjustment takes time the questton is how price levels are deter-
mined in the course of ttme. Models with quanttty ratíoning and prtce
adjustment based on excess demand functions have been investigated by a
number of authors. As shown among others by McCurdy and Yannelís [1985]
and van de Klundert and Peters [1985] stabilíty of the Walrasian equili-
brium may cause problems if the time path of prtces crosses the boundary
between the regime of Keynestan Unemployment and the regime of Repressed
Inflation. Proposed solutions to this problem lead to an extension of
ad-hoc procedures. Such procedures are critized fundamentally by Fisher
[1983]. Price adjustment accordínx to excess demand functions impltci-
tely assumes a Walrasian auctioneer. There is no agent who actually sets
prices.
in this paper we aím at an analysís of opt}mal price tnertia in
-~.
a macroeconomic context. Entrepreneurs are supposed to maximize the pre-
sent value of thetr fírm at each poínt ín time. in the output market the
Eirm envisages monopolistic competition, because of product differentia-
tton. There are costs attached to price chanRes as discussed ín a well-
known paper by Barro [1972]. Further, we assume that entrepreneurs liave
perEect foresight. Thís set of assumpttons corresponds with that of
Rotemberg [1982] with three not unimportant exceptions. First, Rotemberg
~) The authors thank Lex Meydam and Rick van der Ploe~ for their valu-
able comment on a previous version of thís paper.eliminates the possíbilíty that fírms rr~tion [heír customers in the
market for goods. Followin~, Broer [1985] we take account of the possihi-
lity of a classícal dísequílihrium under monopolis[ic competition. The
second difference with Rotemberg's analysis concerns the problem of
capital accumulation. Here again we keep company with Broer by analysing
the long-run adjustment of the capital stock along the línes set out by
Hayashi [1982] and others. Whereas Broer sticks to partial equilihrium
analysis we want to consider the eEfects of macroeconomíc shocks in a
model with endoKenous output price adjustments. Third, Rotemberg assiunes
that the labour market is competitive: wages are fully flexible and
demand always equals supply. In this paper we assume that it takes some
time to clear the lahour market.
The assumption of monopolistíc competition implíes that long-run
equilibria are non-Walrasian. A dis~ussion of the welfare implícatíons
would require a choice-theoretic specificatfon of consumer behaviour as
for instance in Calvo and Phelps [1983]. Here we shall restrict our ana-
lysis to macroeconomíc issues. For this purpose a standard specification
of the consumption function and the liquidity preference function will
do in order to close our model.
The paper is organized as follows. ln section 2 the optimal be-
haviour of Eirms under monopolistic competítion and perfect foresight is
analysed. Section 3 builds upon the results of this analysis hy incor-
porating the behavioural equations in a model for the whole economy.
Simulation results of this macroeconomic model are díscussed in section
4. The paper closes with some conclusions.
2. Optimal behaviour oE firms under perfect foresight
Output of fírms (y~) ís non-storable and can be produced by a
neo-classical produc[ton function:
(1) y~ - f(Rj. kj). f2.' fk' fk2
~ 0; f~R, fkk ~ 0
, where 2 denotes labour and k stands for the capítal stock. The produc-
tion functíon is linear homogeneous. Both consumers and producers demand
good j. The demand functíon is of [he constant elasticity form:3
(2) yj - aJ[-1]-n.l, nj ~ 1
P
where pj is the (nominal) príce oF good j, p is the average price level
and ai is a constant determining the posi[ion of the demand curve for
good j.
Capital accumulation depends on gross investment (i) and depre-
ciation:
(3) kj - ij - 8 kj
Deprecíation is exponentíal at a rate S. To derive a well-behaved in-
vestment function ínstallation costs wíth regard to capital are intro-
duced. The investment expenditure function including these costs is
written as:
(4) ej - g(ij, kj), gi ~ o, gk ~ o, gii ~ o
, where e is real investment expenditure. The function is assumed to be
convex ín i and homogeneous of degree one in its arguments i and k.
Price adjustment may be costly Eor two reasons. Fírst, there are
administrative costs when prices are changed. Second, there are impltcit
cost that result from unfavourable reactíons of consumers to frequent
and large price changes. The la[[er are coined information cost by Rarro
[1972]. Adminístratíve cost can be considered as Lump-sum amounts, inde-
pendent of the direction or magnitude of the príce change. Information
cost may gíve rise to speed-dependent adjustment costs as in the case of
capital accumulation, discussed above. Ignoring administrative costs of
price adjustment and normalízing prices changes on p(s - P) the cost of
adjustment Eunction reads: p
(5) nj - h(sj), h' ~ 0, h" ~ 0
, where n stands for the cost oE price adjustment in real terms. The




Denoting the discount factor by p(t) - e H and dropping
firm subscripts the value of [he firm to he maximized is:
VD - ~ [Y(t) -L~ - R,(t) W(t) - e(t) - n(t)[ P(t)
p(t) w(t)
, where w(t) is the wage rate paid by fírms. For the time being we as-
sume that the supply of labour is infinitely elastic. Investment expen-
diture and adjustment costs are valued at the average price level. Deci-
sions made by the representative firm with regard to prices are supposed
to have only an indirect effec[ on these amounts. Firms maximize VD sub-
ject to the constraints (1) -(5). As observed in section t it may be
optimal for the representatíve firm to ration í.ts customers. The con-
straint (2) should therefore be written with an inequality sign:
(2a) Y(t) z at(-~L)-n
p(t)
The model has the format of an optimal control problem with ínstrument
variables A, i, s and state variables k, p. The Hamiltonian of this pro-
blem dropping time subscripts is:




f us f a{a(Y) n- y~- z2})
a
P
The costate variables q and u are adjoínt to the sta[e variables
P
k and p. The Lagrangean multiplier a relates to the demand constraínt
(2a). This constrafnt ís written as an equality by applyinb the slack
variable z.~`) The symbol a can be interpreted as the shadow price of
sales revenue.
~) For an analysis oE ínequalíty constraínts in optimal contcol problems
see Hadley and Kemp [1971, ch. 5].5
Necessary first order condítions for an optimcun dividíng out
~). equal terms are .
(y) (P f ~~)fQ(k.R) - w
, with ~ - (1 n)P(a)-lIn - P
(8) gi(i.k) - q
(9) h'(s) - u
(10) az - 0
q - (~d)q - (~~)fk(k,k) f gk(i.k)
P
(12) u - (r1-n)u - (1-a)Y
, where n - p~p.
The complementary slackness condition (10) implies a~ 0 iE z- 0. In
this case: ~--~. Substituting this result in (7) and (11) gives: n
(7a) (1 - n)p fQ - w
(lla) q - (rtd)q - (1 - ~)~ f (k,Q) f g (i,k)
n p k k
If z~ 0 we have a- 0 and equattons (7a) and (lla) are still valid.
Cxistence of an optimal policy can be proven along the lines set out in
Broer [1985].
To simplify a little hit we assume that the adjustment function
with regard to príces is quadratic:
(5a)
1 2
n - 2~ s
~) In addition we have the usual transversality conditions:
lim p(t)q(t)k(t) - 0 and lim p(t)p(t) - 0.
t ~ t~h
The full model describing optimal behaviour by firms can then be written
as:
(13a) y - f(R,k)
(13b) fR - ~ (n~~)
(13c) gi(i.k) - q
1- I
(13d) p a(a) n- yp - z2 - 0
(13e) az - 0
(13f) k - i - 6k
(13g) P - P~Yu
(13h) q-(rtd)q -(1- n) ~ fk f gk(i,k)
P
(131) u - ( r~n)u - (1-a)y
For given w and p the model gives a solution for y, ~„ k, t, p, q, u, a,
z. There are two regímes depending on a-O or a~ 0. In case a- 0 we
have z~ 0 and the firm is not operating on the demand curve for íts
product on the short run. Consumers are ratíoned, because labour is too
expensive to produce according to demand. Under these circumstances
demand is not binding and firms equate the marginal product of labour
wíth the real wage rate. Such a situation of excess demand may arise
because it takes time to adjust prices. As the price of output rises
producers increase the supply of goods and sooner or later the demand
cons[raint will be binding (z - 0 and a~ fl). When thís point ís reached
the price will go up further to exploit the monopolistic position of the
f i rm .
The possibility of rationing in case príces change over tíme ís
illustrated in Eigure 1. Demand ín the inítial equilibrium is glven byYZ y3
Figure 1
Y
the curve D, whereas the marginal cost curve ts lndicated by MC. For
simplicity these curves are assumed to the linear. The initial equili-
brium price pl and equilibrium output yl are found from the equality of
marginal cost and marginal revenue (MR). Upon impact of a demand shock
from D towards D' firms will produce up to the poin[ where the price
equals marginal cost (y - y2). With the price of output unchanged con-
sumers demand the quantity y- y3. This results in excess demand for
goods to the amount of y3 - y2.
Dynamic price and quantity adjustmen[ can be analysed more rí-
gourously by ignoring for the ttme hetng capital accumulation and assu-
ming that the stock of capítal is constant. ít then follows from equa-
tion (13g) and equation (131) tha[ ln case of a long-run equílibrium
with p- u- 0 we have a- 1. Therefore in a long-run equilibrium situa-
tion demand will be bínding and producers explott their monopoly posi-
tion according to the statíc theory of prof{t maximization. Now consider
the dynamics in case a remaíns positive (a~0, z-0). Substi[uting l~ from
(13b) and y from (13d) in (l3i) results in:
(14) u - rmu - [1 - n(1 - pf)] a(P)-n
k ps
, where r(- rtn) denotes the nominal rate of interest, which firms take
m
as gíven. Together with:
(13g) p - p~u
we have a systenm of two interdependent diFferential equations in u and
p.~`) The phase diagram of the system is gtven in f{gure 2a. The Line













~) The marginal product of labour L~ depends upon p throu};h y and e„9
more complicated. As shown in appendíx l the slope ís negative for low
values of p but is positive at high values of p. The main characteris-
tics of the functíon are captared by the line shown ín fígure 2a.
As appears from inspection of (l3g) and (14) the long-run solution is a
saddlepoint with the stable arm indicated by SS' in figure 2a. The phase
diagram Eor the case a- 0 ís given in EiRure 2b. The expression for
u- 0 now equals u-~. Because in thls situation there is a positive
relationshíp between }~ and p the slope of the curve for u- 0 is also
posttíve.
The case of an outward shift of the demand curve is presented in
figure 3. If the demand constraint bites less a will fall and become
eventually nega[ive. However a has a lower bound of zero and in that
case there will be some slack. In fiRure 3a it is assumed that a remains
positive. Therefore, the system of differentíal equations (l3g) and (14)
determines the adjustment process from the old equilibrium indicated by
~ ~
pl towards the new long-run value pZ. Following the shock the costate
~
variable u jumps to a point on the stable arm of the saddlepoint p2,
~
Output is raised to meet demand at the existíng príce pl, After this
initial adjustment firms gradually increase prices and output declines
until the new equilibrium is attained. The movement along the stable




(15) P - ~1~ wl - P1
(1- n)fR
Figure 3b
where ~i ~ 0 is the stable root.
In the case presented in fígure 36 there is a larger increase in
demand and a has to be set at zero initíally. There is still a jump in
output at t- 0, but the rise in output is not enough to meet demand at
[he existing price level; consumers are ra[ioned in the market for
goods. The real wage rate equals the marginal product of lahour. Firms
adjust prices gradually and at p- p3 in figure 3b a situation is
reached where demand and supply are again equal.~) From then on a rises
towards its equilibrium value unity and firms are able to explott there
monopoly position. It should be observed that the ínitial jump in u must
~
be such that the stable arm of the saddlepoint p2 must be attained when
p equals p3.
Changes in the nominal wage rate w can be analysed in a similar
way. However, in this case there is no initial change in output. An in-
crease in the wage rate for example leads to an upward adjustment of the
w
~) The value of p3 can be found from equations: f~(2,k) - P and
f(Q,k) - a(~)-n.
PIl
output price over time and a decline ín output. If the wage shock is
relatively large there may be a period oE rationing of consumers to
begin with.
Things are diEferent if capí[al accumula[ion is taken into ac-
count. Because the productton function and the cost of the adjustment
function for capital are linear homogenous an increase in demand induces
a proportional rise in 2, and k ín the long run. ThereEore, the long-run
equilibrium price rematns unchanged. An increase in nominal wages in-
duces capítal deepening. As can be easily seen from equations (l3b) and
(13h) the long-run equilibrium value of the price level will now be
hígher. Assuming saddlepoínt stability the dynamics of the system can be
descríbed in a way analogous to our prevtous analysis with constant k.
Upon impact of a shock the costate variables q and u wi11 jump to the
stable arm (for a i 0) and adjustment towards the new long-run values
will take place smoothly. In case the demand constraint is not binding
initially things are more complicate of course.
3. A macroeconomic model wíth endogenous price adjustment
Before a macroeconomic model can he developed something has to
be said about aggregation. To simplify we assume that demand elastici-
ties are uniform across firms. Equatton (2) can then be rewritten as:
- . n
(16) Yj - n[~] . n~ 1 j~ 1.......n
P
n
, with y- E y, and n denottng the number of Eirms.~) Following Iwai
j-1 ~
[1981] and Svensson [1985] the formula for the average prtce index can
be represented by:
(17) P - [ E pj-n]}I(1-n)
j-1
~) In Svensson [1985] there is a continucun of firms defined by the unit
interval 0~ j ~ 1, where each fírm is indexed by j.12
It can then be shown that the system of demand equations defined by (16)
and (l7) is consisten[ with maximization of the utility function:
(18) U - F y(n-1)~n
j-1 j
, subject to the expenditure constraint:
(19)
n
F pjy.l - P Y
j-1
In equilibrium all firms choose the same price, hence p. - p for all j.
J
Firms consider the príces of other firms as given. The equilibrium could
therefore be coined a Nash-Ra[ional F,xpectattons Equilibrium as sugges-
ted by Rotemberg [1982]. The necessary condítíon for an optimum at the
firm level can now be applied also on the macroeconomic level where
total demand (y) equals the sum of aggregate consumption (c) and aggre-
gate ínvestment expenditure ( e).~`)
To complete the macroeconomic mode] with endogenous price
changes we need a consumption function and equations for the money mar-
ket. Consumer behaviour will not be modelled explicitly. Instead we pos-
tulate a standard consumption function:
(20) c- c(Y,r,k) , cy ~ 0 , ck ~ 0 , cr c 0
The supply of money (M) is exogenous, while the demand for money follows
from the standard specification:
(21) p - m(y,r) my ~ 0 , mr ~ 0
The nominal interest rate rather than the real interest rate should be
in equation (2l). As observed by 8lanchard [1983] the present specifica-
tíon eliminates the "Mundell effect".
~) The implication of this approach is that investment goods are of dif-
ferent quality, and qualities are chossen according [o preferences spe-
cified ín equation (18). This is the "price" to be paid if one wants to
avoid the modelling of a two-sector economy.13
Labour supply is exogenous. The nomínal wage rate responds to excess
demand ín the market for labour over tíme. Following ftlanchard and Sachs
(1982] we assume that households supply all the labour demanded by
firms, which means that firms are never constrained ín the market for
labour. The regime of Repressed Inflation is therefore eliminated.
The full macroeconomíc model can now be formul.ated as follows:
(22a) Yd - cd } g(i.k)
(22b) Rd - kd(Yd.k)
w
(22c) Rw - kw(p ,k)
(22d) Yw - f(Rw,k)
(22e) y -
min(Yd,Yw)
(22f) R, - min(R,d,2w)
(22g) cd - cd(Y,r.k)
(22h) gi(i,k) - q
(22i) p - m(Y,r)





c - cd - (Yd-Y)
k- i - dk
q - (rFb)q - (1- ~)f (k
e[fective demand
Keynesian demand for labour
demand for labour in case of
rationing ín the goods market
output in case of rationing in
the goods market
rationing rule for goods




shadow-price of the sales
constraint
rationing rule for consumption
accumulation of capital
n k ,R,) f gk(i,k)
costate variable for k14
(22n) p - ~yup price formation
(220) u-(rf- p)u -(I-a)y costate variahle for p
(22p) w - (iw(R-R ) wage formatton
s
It is assumed that only consumers are ratíoned in the market for goods
and in the labour market.
In models with monopolistic competitton it can he shown that the
employment function has the real wage rate and effective demand as ex-
planatory variables, if. the elasttcity of demand with respect to the
relative price depends on output (see Eor instance Layard and Nickell
[1985]). In our model the employment function depends upon the prevai-
ling regime as follows from equations (22b) and (22c). The assumption of
a constant elasttcity of demand ís immaterial to this result. In the
classtcal regime effective demand has no influence on employment. In the
Keynesian regíme the influence of the wage rate on labour demand is only
indirect. The reason for this is that output prices are fixed in the
short run.
If the demand constraint is bLnding (a ~ ~) combining (22j) and
(22m) gives:
f
(22m1) q - (rtd)q - ~ fk f gk
R
Firms invest to save lahour costs. This resul.t corresponds with the out-
come in case of a Keynesian regime under perfect competition as discus-
sed in Blanchard and Sachs [1982], van de Klundert and Peters [1985].
For a- 0 we get:
(22m2) q - (rt6)q - fk } gk
This is the classical regime: investment is governed by the return to
capi[al. As shown by Hayashi [1982] the shadow price q is then equal to15
~)
the observable average value of capital (Tobin's q).
In a stationary state we have: k- q- p- u- w- 0. Substitu-
ting these conditions in equations (22R)-(22p) gives the followíng long-
run solutions: u~ - 0, a~ - 1, R~ - Rs, i~ - ók~. It should he noted
that in the long-run equilíbrium sítuation the demand constraint is bin-
ding (a-1). In case a would be zero, y would be zero too, which does not
make economic sense. It will be assinned tliat the marginal valuation of
present consump[ion in terms of future consumption is independent of the
absolute size of. the consumption stream. As observed by Rose [1966] the
consumption function is then homogeneous of. the first degree in y and k:
(23) ka - ~l(k ' 1'r)
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(24e) w~ - (1- ~)p~fR(k s)
aR
(24f) M,~ - mCY~,r~)
P
(24g) (r~fó)q~ - (1- n)fk(a~s) - gk(ó)
k
~) It should be noted that thís result is obtained under the condition
of constant returns to scale both in productlon and installatton: the
Eunctions f and g are linear homogeneous. Cos[s of price adjustment
ought to be ígnored.16
, wíth the symbol a indicating a qualíty índex for labour. Inspection of
the model reveals that q~ is determined by eqc~ation (24c), whereas the
capital output ratio follows from equations (24a) and (24b). If the
~ ~
solutíon for y ~k is substituted into equation (24d) the capi[al-labour
ratio is found. The equilibrium value of the capital-labour ratio deter-
mines the long-run solution of the rate of interest r~` according to
equation (24g). Wítti the rate of interest known the price level follows
from equation (24f). Finally the (nominal) wage rate ís obtaiaed from
equation (24e).
It is now possible to study tite comparatíve statics of the long-
run model. It appears that a change in effective labour supply (aks)
leads to a proportional mutation in the equilibriiun value of the stock
of capital. In this case the long-run ra[e of interest remains unaf-
fected. An increase in the money stock leads to an increase ín the nomi-
nal price level with all other vartables maintaining their value. Money
ís thereEore neutral in the long run.
The impact oE a of shock depends amonR other thíngs on the non-
predetermined state variables q and u. The short-run impact of changes
in exogenous variables and the process of adjustment towards a(new)
long-run equtlibrium can be traced by numerical examples. Applying the
method of multiple shootinR as explained in Lipton, et.al. [1982] this
wi11 be done in the next section. The specification of functions applied
and the chosen parameter values are given in appendíx 2.
4. Simulation results on a macroeconomic level
'I'he results of a once and for all 5~ decrease in the money stock
at t-0 are presented in table l. All variables (except a and u) are
measured as percentage deviations from the orígínal steady state values.
There are three roots with negative real parts and two roots with posi-
tive real parts corresponding wi[h the number of respectively the pre-
determined and the non-predetermined state variables. Therefore the
model exhibits saddle-point stability.17










~ l 2 5 LO SS
-4.l -2.4 -1.4 -~.3 -Q.I ~
-3.1 -1.9 -I.l -0.3 -0.'L (1
-4.l -2.4 -l.4 -0.3 -0.1 0
-6.5 -3.7 -2.(l -0.2 ~.0 0
6.4 4.~ 2.7 O.H (1.3 0
I.10 1.(17 1.05 1.~1 1.00 1
0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0
-l.6 -0.8 -0.4 ~.1 0.1 0
0 -2.0 -3.3 -4.7 -4.8 -5
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0
~ -2.5 -3.f3 -5.(1 -S.Q -5
Money ts not neutra] in the short run íf price chanF;es are cost-
ly. Firms accept lower prof[ts from operattons because it pays to let
prices decrease slowly. The resultinl; prtce rl};idity causes a recesston
with a substantial decline tn output and employment. A higher value for
a(a ~ 1) points to a more binding demand constralnt. These results are
remarkable, because the costs of price adjustment are moderate. From
equation (5a) the adjustment costs of a 5i change in price with ~- 0.1
amount to 0.0125 in real terms. The cumulative loss in output exceeds
this number by far. (hier the Flrst 1L1 periods the cumulative output gap
is already equal to 10~ of the initial steady state value, which in the
present example comes down to an absolute amount of 0.12. There is of
course no contradiction ínvolved. The numher of flrms is larl;e and each
firm must incur the cost of price adjustment. To pnt it dLfferently: the
output figurc~s tn table 1 are macroeconomic resul.ts, which must be spl[t
up among a large numher of firms. There is no monopoly of supply on the1R
macroeconomic level. Instead there are many firms observing their own
demand curve. As our numerical example, based on reasonable values of
parameters, shows small costs of price adjustment under these circum-
stances have important consequences for output and employment.
Changes in the stock of capital are of minor importance. The
decline in capacity raises margtnal labour cost in the medium run, but
the fall in real wages has an opposite effect. No much harm would be
done if in the present case capital accumulation would be left out.
Ignoring the possibility of "repressed inflation" the result of
an increase in money is the exact image of the result presented in table
1. It pays again to adjust prices slowly. ProEits from operations are
below their long-run eqiiilibrium level, which is now reflected in a
value of a below unity. Consumers are not rationed unless a falls below
zero. Things would be different in case of perfect competition and price
formation based on excess demand. Then a positive demand shock leads
upon impact to a"classical disequilibrium", because meeting demand
would mean suffering a loss. In case monopolistic competition prevails
monolopy profits serve as a buffer, which enables firms to meet demand.
It is only when the shock is very large that productng according to
demand may imply that the price of output does not cover marginal
(labour) cost. In such a sítuation firms decide to ration their custo-
mers until prices have risen sufEiciently. The mainly symmetrical output
response in case of imperfect competition gives the model a more Keyne-
sian flavour compared with the competitive model. Our next example of a
negative supply shock illustrates this point still further.19







0 1 2 5 10 SS
- 2.7 - 4.8 - 5.7 - 6.0 - 6.1 - 7.9
- 2.0 - 3.7 - 4.5 - 5.0 - 5.4 - 7.9
- 2.7 - 4.8 - 5.7 - 6.0 - 6.1 - 7.9
4.0 0.6 - 0.7 - 0.7 0.0 0
-16.5 -12.3 -10.1 - 7.7 - 6.7 0
0.73 0.86 0.93 1.00 1.00 1
(l - 0.3 - 0.7 - 1.7 - 3.l - 7.9
- 1.0 - 1.7 - 1.9 - 1.7 - 1.2 0
0 3.0 4.3 5.1 5.4 8.6
0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0
0 1.0 0.9 - 0.5 - 1.1 0
The results presented tn table 2 relate to a permanent decline
in total Eactor produc[ivity of 5Í at t~0. Th[s corresponds to a decline
tn labour quality of 7.9~ in case the production function is Cobb-
Ib uglas and the elasticity of production with regard to labour amounts
to 0.625. As shown ín section 3 the capital stock decreases at the same
rate ín the lonb run, whereas the long-run rate of interest does not
change. With the stock of money gíven the prtce level increases to com-
pensate for the fall ín output on long term. The real wage ra[e falls
because the supply of la}x~ur is perfectly ínelasttc.
Things are dífferent in the short run. The lower productivity
level reduces the profitability of investment. Effective demand ís even
further depressed by the multiplter mechantsm. The demand constraint
bites however less (a ~ 1) because there }s a downward pressure on sup-
ply in case of an increase tn cost. As long as a is positive firms pro-
duce what can be sold at the going price even if they have to hire more20
labour. The rise in employment underllneti the demand oriented character
of the model. In a competittve world with price ínflexibility an adverse
supply shock may lead to classtcal unemployment (see for instance
Blanchard and Sachs [1982]).
The development of employment over ttme is governed by demand
and supply factors. As effective demand decreases employment declines
and in period t-2 there is even some unemployment. Capital decumulation
in combination with a fall in real wages reverses the situation and from
period t-1() onward labour demand and labour supply are more or less
balanced. As appears from table 2 the process of adjustment towards the
new long-run equilibrium last some time in the present case.
5. Conclusions
It is tnteresting to note that the results of our model are tn a
number of ways qualltatively different from those of disequilibrium
models as for instance presented by Blanchard and Sachs [1982], van de
Klundert and Peters [1985]. In the present analysis rationing of con-
sumers seems a somewhat remote possibílity, at least starttng from a
long-run equilibrium position. A macroeconomic demand pull leads to an
increase in output in the short run, becaiise firms change prices slowly
while at the same time they want to sell more at the going price.
As emphasízed by Rotemberg [1982] in case prices adapt without a
time lag changes in the quan[ity of money have no effect on real
variables even if firms are monopolis[s. It sliould be noted that this
result differs from the view expressed by Hart [1982] that imperfect
competition as such implies a model with Keynesian features. However,
Hart analyses imperfectly competitive equilibría where demand shocks
relate to a shift in demand for the produced good versus the non-pro-
duced good.
The ad-hoc modelling of the labour market remains an unsatis-
factory aspect of the model presented here. To deal wíth this problem
one could opt for a model of wage setting hy firms or labour unions.
Costs of wage adjustment could then eventually be introduced to allow
for disequilibrium in the labour market. Extensions like these are cer-
tainly on our agenda.21
Appendix 1
From (14) we get for u- ~:
(A1) u - [1 - n(1- `'')] a ~ n
pfk rm
Differentiating with regard to p gives:
du a -(nfl) w w fR.2 a -(ntl)
(A2) dp - n r P {(n-1) -(ntl) pf - t f 2 n r- p }
m R 2 fR m
`--v- `Y~ `-ti-~ `---~-- -'
t f
Inspectton of equatton (A2) reveals that the derivative is negative for
low values of p and positive for high values of p. From (A1) it follows
that u a 0 for p i m and u i~ Eor p a 0. The functton (A1) is thereEore
of the form as shown in figure 4. The numher of inflection points or


















Parameter values should be based on empirical estimates and tead to rea-
sonable outcomes for importmrt ratios tn the ~~conumy.
The full set of parameter values used in computations is given by:
a- 0.625 B- 0.5 Y- 0.8 d- ~.1 e- 1
~- 0.15 n- 5 e- 5 X- 0.25 ~, - ~.l
The chosen values of the ex~};enous variables are:
R,s - 1 , M - 1~023
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Th. van de Klundert and P. Peters
In macroeconomic models with quanttty ratíoníng price changes,
if any, are frequently based on ad-hoc assumptions. in the present model
changes in the price of output are the result oE choice-theoretic consi-
derations. It is supposed that price changes are costly and that costs
are speed-dependent.
Ignoring labour scarct[y there are two ret;ímes. If real labour
costs are relatively high firms may not operate on their demand curves.
Thís situation is reminiscent of classícal disequilibrium. Otherwise
firms produce according to demand, but may not realize the preferred
position in the short run. In section 2 of the paper these problems are
analysed from a microeconomic perspective.
In section 3 the model is extended to a full macroeconomic model
by making demand endogenous. Wage formation is modelled in a traditional
way by assuming that wages respond to excess demand in the market for
labour. Because the model becomes rather complex full analytical solu-
tíons are now out of reach. Instead numerical exercises are worked
through by applying the techntque of multiple shooting.i
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